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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the link between democracy, bureaucratic capacity and environmental quality. 
While many previous empirical studies traditionally have focused on either the democracy or bu-
reaucratic capacity side of the story, they failed to acknowledge that both these factors in their in-
terplay determine the delivery of public policy outcomes. This paper suggests that to account for 
the functioning of both the input and output side of the political system, democracy and bureau-
cratic capacity have to be considered in interaction. By employing the between estimator, the study 
empirically tests this claim on one of the major environmental problems—air pollution. The results 
show that the effect of democracy on carbon dioxide emissions is indeed contingent on the levels 
of bureaucratic capacity: Democracies emit less only if their bureaucratic capacity is high. If bureau-
cratic capacity is low, democracies do not do any better than authoritarian regimes.  
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Introduction 
 
In an era marked by the prevalence of democracy and the looming threat of the environmental 
crisis, research consistently aims to answer a question: Can democracy generate effective solutions 
to environmental problems? Indeed, the participation of civil society, the rise of environmental 
awareness through free media, and active collaboration in international environmental agree-
ments—features common to democracies—have been said to play a crucial role in placing envi-
ronmental issues on the political agenda and for adopting environmental policies. What is equally 
crucial, however, is whether these environmental policies essentially get implemented.  
 
Recent research claims that democracy, with its free elections and wide representation of different 
interests in power structures, is necessary but might not be a sufficient condition for solving socie-
tal problems, since it does not account for the ability of governments to implement policies (Roth-
stein 2011). While keeping the previous focus on democracy, this paper also underscores the im-
portance of bureaucratic capacity in reaching desirable policy outcomes. While democracy level can 
determine how different issues are brought up on the political agenda and how political decisions 
are made, bureaucratic capacity, often characterized by the absence of corruption and meritocratic 
employment, determines whether and how the decisions are implemented. The paper thus suggests 
that the two processes should be analyzed in conjunction whenever we talk about their effect on 
public policy outcomes.  
 
The interaction between democracy level and bureaucratic capacity is especially important for those 
societal problems that require long-term thinking from decision-makers and that cannot be solved 
by short-term quid pro quo exchanges in electoral campaigns. Such problems include the environ-
ment. Clean environment generally refers to environmental conditions in which it is possible for 
people to sustain good health, including, e.g., clean air free from harmful chemicals and particles 
and clean drinkable water. Despite the fact that environmental quality directly affects human health 
and welfare, environmental protection is often not the first priority for citizens due to more press-
ing material needs (Inglehart 1990; Cotgrove and Duff 1981). Since the effect of environmental 
policies cannot be directly observed after the implementation process has been initiated, environ-
mental issues are therefore not necessarily a priority on the political agenda. While political leaders 
in democracies are known to be short-sighted due to constant political challenge through electoral 
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cycles (Congleton 1992), high bureaucratic capacity in democracies acts as a buffer against policy 
revisions when governments change (ICRG 2014), and therefore is favorable to long-term policy 
commitments (Charron and Lapuente 2011). 
 
This paper empirically tests whether the effect of democracy on the environment is contingent on 
the level of bureaucratic capacity. To do this, I perform between-effects regression using time-series 
cross-section data for one of the major types of environmental problems—air pollution, measured 
in the amount of carbon dioxide emissions per capita. The issue both requires the government to 
adopt rules and regulations aimed at restricting pollution levels and collective action from polluters 
to conform to the regulations. In addition, it requires a strong functioning government apparatus to 
implement the decision, enforce the rules and monitor the compliance of polluters. 
  
The next section provides a brief overview of the existing literature on the relationship between 
democracy, bureaucratic capacity and environmental quality and introduces the theoretical model of 
the study. Further I describe the data and present the empirical strategy. Next comes the presenta-
tion of the results and discussion of the main findings. The last section offers conclusions.  
 
Theoretical framework  
 
Environmental policy outcomes 
 
Let us consider political processes as a constant cyclical connection between input and output of 
the political system (Easton 1965). The input side of the political system represents the aggregated 
preferences of the citizenry (in democracies) or the elite (in authoritarian regimes) that affect deci-
sion-making (Cornell and Grimes 2015). During the policy-making process, preferences are trans-
formed into policy outputs in the form of laws and regulations, “statutes produced by legislatures” 
(Ringquist 1995). After the implementation process, which implies administrative actions taken by 
the bureaucracy, citizens can observe the actual impact of public policies or policy outcomes—“the 
consequences for society […] that stem from government action and inaction” (Anderson 2003).  
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FIGURE 1, POLICY-MAKING PROCESS WITHIN A POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
 
Environmental quality, which is the focus of this paper, is an environmental outcome of environ-
mental protection legislation (Ringquist 1995). The analysis of this paper does not cover policies or 
policy outputs directly, but implicitly addresses them as intermediary factors in the chain of the 
policy-making process. Environmental performance throughout the text is used interchangeably 
with environmental quality to underscore the actions the actors take to achieve higher environmen-
tal quality. 
 
Democracy and the environment 
 
Recent comprehensive reviews of the literature on the democracy-environment relationship are 
well presented by Li and Reuveny (2006), Bernauer and Koubi (2009),1 and Sjöstedt and Jagers 
(2014). The main theoretical arguments explaining why democracies are expected to take better care 
of the environment than non-democracies can be summarized as follows. 
 
Firstly, political rights and freedom of media increase public awareness of environmental problems 
and therefore promote adoption of environmental policies. This mechanism mostly functions 
through the work of environmental groups and public opinion (Schultz and Crockett 1990; Payne 
1995). Secondly, a democratic regime is more responsive to the environmental concerns of the 
public than non-democracy through electoral accountability and the possibility for green parties to 
organize and participate in decision-making (Kotov and Nikitina 1995). Thirdly, democratic values 
                                                     
1
 The reader should note a mistake in the article by Bernauer and Koubi (2009), in which the authors cite and interpret 
Congleton (1992), whose model predicts a positive relationship between democracy and pollution control, not negative, 
as authors claim. 
Input
  
Preference aggregat-
ion  
Policy 
output  
Policy 
outcome  
Contingent on the level of democracy Contingent on the bureaucratic capacity 
  6 
are more environmentally friendly than values promoted in autocracies: Democracies comply with 
international environmental treaties because they respect rule of law (Weiss and Jacobson 1999). 
Respect for human rights and human life in democracies leaves less space for harmful environmen-
tal degradation (Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2003). Fourthly, public masses in democracies have higher 
pro-environmental attitudes than the elites in autocracies because reduced production and con-
sumption affect the elites economically (Congleton 1992). Finally, democracies are expected to have 
better environmental performance, since the median voter has longer time horizons and cares 
about long-term environmental improvement more than elites in autocratic regimes that aim for 
short-term outcomes and allocate resources away from environmental issues (Congleton 1992).  
 
However, arguments have also been raised as to why democracies might perform comparatively 
worse than authoritarian states in managing their environments. Firstly, autocrats have the coercive 
power to reorient society for sustainability, while in democracies, free individuals will tend to over-
harvest common-pool resources and deviate from environmentally friendly behavior (Hardin 1968). 
Secondly, and closely related, autocracies can impose restrictions on population growth (Heilbroner 
1974). Thirdly, since democracies are mainly market economies and corporate interests rank high in 
political decision-making, access of businesses to power makes it harder to keep environmental 
priorities higher than economic ones (Dryzek 1987). Fourthly, democracies might prioritize eco-
nomic interests to satisfy the needs of specific groups of voters and win more votes (Midlarsky 
1998). This reasoning led to the development of the idea of “environmental authoritarianism.” The 
existing few papers on environmental authoritarianism define such a regime “as a public policy 
model that concentrates authority in a few executive agencies manned by capable and uncorrupt 
elites seeking to improve environmental outcomes” (Gilley 2012, 288).  
 
Although there is strong criticism of environmental authoritarianism (Shahar 2015), the main idea is 
clear: For environmental outcomes to be achieved, elites in a state need to “seek” improvement in 
environmental outcomes and have the coercive capacity to implement policies. This conclusion can 
in fact be projected to any type of regime.  
 
Empirical support is as ambiguous as theoretical arguments. Numerous quantitative studies find a 
positive effect of democracy on some environmental outcomes and negative or no effect on others 
(e.g. Li and Reuveny 2006; Midlarsky 1998; Mak Arvin and Lew 2009). The important limitation of 
the studies that examine the relationship between the level of democracy and the environmental 
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outcomes, however, is that only a few control for the implementation segment of the policy pro-
cess, namely bureaucratic capacity. 
 
Environmental quality is not simply affected by the presence or absence of regulation. Pollution is 
also affected by different levels of regulation; stringency of regulation is more important when it 
comes to policy outcomes than the presence or absence of regulation. (Ringquist 1995, 311) 
 
Autocratic and democratic political regimes, with respect to efforts to improve environmental 
quality, in principle differ on the input side of the political system—the way in which incentives to 
invest in improving environmental quality are formed (see Figure 1). The empirical evidence shows 
that in democracies, the issue is brought up through strong “green” civil society movements 
(Dryzek 2003), corporatist interests' influence (Scruggs 1999; Scruggs 2001) or international pres-
sure (Neumayer 2002). In autocracies, the decision more exclusively depends on the will of the 
autocrat and the elite and can be affected by, for instance, international pressure or pressure from 
the public, to a much lesser extent. 
 
However, as depicted in Figure 1, the decision to protect the environment and the actual outcome 
are separated by the chain of the policy-making process. After the issue appears on the political 
agenda, there comes the decision to prioritize the environment alongside other budget expendi-
tures, adopt laws and regulations. Consequently, environmental regulations enter an implementa-
tion stage that includes introduction of the appropriate policy instruments, monitoring and en-
forcement (Howlett et al. 2009).  
 
A clear statute is not enough to ensure policy success [...] The statute must also provide the imple-
menting agency with technical resources, policy tools, and sanctions for noncompliance that are 
adequate for the task in hand. (Ringquist 1993, 1026) 
 
Therefore, regardless of the way “environmental input” reaches decision-making stage, all types of 
political regimes require a well-functioning state apparatus that implements the decisions. Indeed, 
as Huntington (1991, 2589) notes:  
 
Democracies may be: inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests 
and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These make such governments 
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undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic. [Therefore,]  democracy should be clearly 
distinguished from the other characteristics of political systems.  
 
Bureaucratic capacity and the environment  
 
The importance of the state’s bureaucratic capacity for the provision of public goods and services is 
broadly discussed in political economy literature, which emphasizes that without well-functioning 
institutions, the selfish goals of political leaders will prevent them from acting for the collective 
good (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Miller 2000; North 1981). In a weak state with low capacity, political 
actors can engage in quid pro quo exchanges, and voters will benefit from club or private goods 
instead (Charron and Lapuente 2010).  
 
High administrative capacity is especially important in the implementation of such policies that are 
not the first priority on governments’ agendas, such as—often—environmental policies. Without 
the efficient organization of the government apparatus, implementation will be delayed, and the 
ability of the state to monitor compliance of citizens and organizations and punish free-riders will 
be decreased (D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 2013).   
 
Ringquist (1993) particularly underscores that the necessary element of bureaucratic capacity is a 
competent agency committed to program goals, which provides adequate inspections and well-
targeted enforcement in environmental policy implementation. Weiss and Jacobson (1999) state 
that administrative capacity is crucial for compliance with international agreements. 
 
One of the most disruptive forces influencing bureaucratic or administrative capacity is corruption, 
which interferes in the hiring process of government officials and thus affects competence level and 
the level of commitment to policy goals. It disrupts the rule of law: In corrupt societies, bureaucrats 
can be bribed, and rules are simply not followed. In a corrupt system, public revenues can be di-
verted from their target purpose and enrich government officials instead. Since corruption can 
account for many disruptive processes within this political system, this paper further uses corrup-
tion as a proxy for bureaucratic capacity.  
 
The literature suggests that corruption can influence environmental outcomes through at least four 
driving forces. First, corruption can directly decrease stringency of the environmental regulations 
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(Damania et al. 2003) and the effectiveness of environmental policy implementation (López and 
Mitra 2000) by affecting the level of compliance (Wilson and Damania 2005). In the regulations of 
emissions, for example, corruption creates “an opportunity for the inspector and firm to engage in 
corrupt behavior by colluding and underreporting true emission levels” (Damania 2002, 410). Pol-
luting businesses can also avoid complying with environmental regulations by bribing government 
officials (Desai 1998, 300). O'Connor (1994, 94) similarly points out that “when violators of stand-
ards are detected […] polluters are exempted from fines […] because of the power they wield.” In a 
corrupt system, inspectors can choose to remain blind to illegal actions through either inadequate 
enforcement, information sharing or being directly involved themselves, as Sundström (2015) finds 
in his in-depth study of corrupt practices in South African fisheries. 
 
Secondly, theoretical work and empirical evidence shows that corruption can indirectly affect the 
environment by hindering economic growth and therefore either decreasing pollution at lower lev-
els of economic development by obstructing growth of industries or increasing pressure on the 
environment in high-income countries by preventing green investments (Welsch 2004; Cole 2007).2  
 
Thirdly, absence of corruption facilitates collective action by increasing trust among individuals and 
in governmental institutions. People in high trust societies are more inclined to comply with the 
rules and contribute to the common good (Rothstein and Eek 2009; Richey 2010). Therefore, cor-
ruption, through low trust, weakens stringency of environmental tax policy by decreasing incentives 
for citizens to pay taxes (Fredriksson and Mani 2002; Welsch 2004).  
 
Fourthly, corruption hampers policy setting, since polluting businesses can directly bribe policy-
makers to push through their interests into decision-making (Wilson and Damania 2005). It also 
decreases time horizons of political leaders (Charron and Lapuente 2011), who have less incentives 
to adopt policies, outcomes from which can only be seen after a long time lag, since they know that 
corruption will hamper implementation.  
 
Hypothesizing the relationship between democracy level, bureaucratic capacity and the 
environment  
                                                     
2
 Also, see Cole (2007) for a recent comprehensive review of the corruption-pollution relationship. 
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In this paper, I marry the two literatures and propose a hypothesis claiming that there is an interac-
tion between the level of democracy and bureaucratic capacity in their effect on environmental 
quality. If we consider the effect of political factors on the environment, the level of democracy on 
its own is insufficient for determining environmental quality, since it does not fully account for how 
decisions are implemented. The level of democracy mainly influences how the input side of the 
political system functions and how political decisions to protect the environment are formed, while 
bureaucratic capacity defines how these decisions are implemented and whether they are imple-
mented at all. Bureaucratic capacity, however, does not solely determine the outcomes either, since 
priorities on environmental commitments have to be first set on the input side of the system. 
Therefore, it is worth considering how different regimes deliver policy outcomes depending on the 
bureaucratic capacity, that is, the interaction between the input side (influenced by the level of de-
mocracy3) and the implementation side (influenced by bureaucratic capacity). The processes togeth-
er in large part determine how the political system functions and plays out for environmental quali-
ty (see Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL PERFORMANCE 
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A few studies have looked at both sides of the story, but to my knowledge, there have so far been 
no attempts to theorize or test the interactive relationship. Sjöstedt and Jagers (2014) directly in-
clude democracy and corruption in the same model and test which of the two factors is more im-
portant when predicting the quality of the marine environment in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results 
                                                     
3
 Low levels of democracy correspond to authoritarian regimes.  
4
 The reader should keep in mind that bureaucratic capacity and democracy are also related, which could be depicted with an arrow 
between the respective boxes on Figure 2, implying mediation. However, since the relationship between the two is not the main focus of 
the study and I do not explore the mediation effect, I do not illustrate it here and instead focus on the relationship between the character-
istics of the political system on the one hand and environmental performance on the other hand. 
Democracy  
Environmental 
performance 
Bureaucratic ca-
pacity 
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show that lower corruption and higher democracy are independently associated with healthier ma-
rine ecosystems. Once both the predictors are included in the model, however, corruption becomes 
no longer significant. The authors conclude that corruption does not have a stronger effect on the 
environment than does democracy. In contrast, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) in their analysis of 
the relationship between corruption and environmental policy stringency find that when corruption 
is included in the model, the effect of democracy disappears. The authors conclude that the positive 
relationship between democracy and environmental protection found in the previous studies was 
due to correlation between high democracy and low corruption. These conflicting findings can be 
attributed to different country samples, different methodologies (pooled OLS vs. cross-country 
OLS) leading to different conclusions, and different dependent variables (observed outcome vs. 
policy stringency). 
 
In this paper, I will advance the previous attempts and directly test the independent and interde-
pendent effect of democracy and bureaucratic capacity (here operationalized with corruption) on 
environmental quality. The expected relationship is illustrated in Figure 3. Environmental outcomes 
are expected to benefit from high bureaucratic capacity in both democratic and non-democratic 
regimes, since it implies the capacity of the state to carry out its tasks, including implementation of 
environmental policies. Political leaders are also more likely to commit themselves to environmen-
tal protection in regimes with high bureaucratic capacity irrespective of the level of democracy. 
However, the effect of bureaucratic capacity on the environment is expected to be higher in de-
mocracies. 
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FIGURE 3, EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY LEVEL, BUREAUCRATIC CAPACI-
TY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In democracies (the right end of the X axis in Figure 3), high capacity of the bureaucracy to imple-
ment tasks is crucial to counterbalance the short-sightedness of the political leaders, who fight for 
power in short electoral cycles. It can prevent vote-buying and provision of “club” goods that are 
restricted to certain groups of people, instead of public goods, which are available to all. As a buff-
er, it can secure policies that require long-term commitments, such as environmental policies, 
against policy changes when the government changes (ICRG 2014). In a democracy with low bu-
reaucratic capacity, long-term commitments such as environmental policies are less probable, since 
political leaders will be reluctant to make decisions that are unlikely to be implemented. In a coun-
try drenched in corruption and clientelism, polluting industries can also bribe policy-makers to 
support non-environmentally friendly decisions. 
 
A similar picture is anticipated in autocracies with low bureaucratic capacity (the left end of the X 
axis in Figure 4), in which the interests of the narrow elite influence governmental decisions. The 
mechanism of how low bureaucratic capacity can influence environmental outcomes was described 
in the previous section. Although the nuances differ from case to case, generally, I expect bureau-
cratic capacity to be positively related to environmental quality, regardless of the regime. In autoc-
racies, however, bureaucratic capacity is expected to matter less for the implementation of envi-
ronmental policies than in democracies, since decision-making and implementation in autocracies 
are less dependent on the non-elite actors.  
Low bureaucratic 
capacity 
Level of democracy 
High bureaucratic 
capacity 
Environmental 
performance 
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Therefore, among autocracies, the difference in environmental performance between countries with 
high and low bureaucratic capacity is expected to be low, while in democracies, the difference in 
environmental performance of countries with high and low bureaucratic capacity is expected to be 
high. Similarly, democracies with high bureaucratic capacity are expected to have better environ-
mental quality than autocracies with good institutions, while democracies with low bureaucratic 
capacity are expected to have lower environmental performance than autocracies with low capacity. 
In an authoritarian regime with high bureaucratic capacity, environmental quality is expected to be 
higher, however, than in a democracy with low bureaucratic capacity, since such a state is expected 
to have a strong rule of law and therefore to act as an “enforcer.” In democracies, though, institu-
tions, as a set of independent rules, are crucial, since they play the role of enforcer that imposes 
checks and balances on governmental leaders and prevents free-riding (D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 
2013). Without it, the democratic system becomes an empty shell, simply opening up opportunities 
for corruption, patronage and clientelism (Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014, 144).  
 
From this discussion follows the hypothesis: 
 
H1 The effect of democracy on environmental performance is contingent on the level of bureaucratic capacity.  
 
The contingency of the effect can imply numerous different patterns. Following the suggestion by 
Berry et al. (2012) on formulation of interaction hypotheses, I specify the relationship pattern as 
follows: 
 
H1.1 A higher level of democracy is associated with higher environmental performance only when bureaucratic capacity 
is high. 
 
H1.2 When bureaucratic capacity is low, there is no significant difference in environmental performance at high and 
low levels of democracy. 
 
Following the findings from Bäck and Hadenius (2008), which indicate that administrative capacity 
is higher in strong authoritarian states than in states that are only partially democratized, this paper 
also suggests that:  
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H1.3 Political systems with high bureaucratic quality and low levels of democracy have higher environmental perfor-
mance than political systems with low bureaucratic capacity and high levels of democracy.  
 
The relationship pattern suggested in the hypotheses is illustrated in Figure 3 and can be summa-
rized in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1, THE EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY LEVEL, BUREAUCRATIC CA-
PACITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (EP) 
 
  Democracy 
   Low High 
Bureaucratic 
capacity 
Low Low EP Low EP 
High Higher EP High EP 
 
Data 
 
In this paper, I test whether the proposed interactive relationship between democracy and bureau-
cratic capacity holds for one of the major environmental problems—air pollution. One of the most 
widely used measures of air pollution is carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per capita, which also ac-
count for the largest share of greenhouse gases associated with climate change. CO2 emissions are 
largely a by-product of energy use. They result from combustion of fossil fuels to generate electrici-
ty and heating, burning of gasoline and diesel in transportation, and chemical reactions in the pro-
duction of metals, cement and chemicals, and other industry activities.   
 
Data on emissions levels have certain advantages over the data on chemical concentration of the 
pollutant in the atmosphere. Concentration data are only relevant for the city level and are difficult 
to reliably estimate, since pollutants travel. Emissions, on the other hand, directly reflect actions 
that emitters take, since the measure directly shows how much polluting enterprises release.5 The 
indicator is taken from Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research and is measured in 
tons of CO2 emissions per capita per country and per year (Oliver et al. 2014). The CO2 data are 
                                                     
5
 Carbon dioxide emissions from forest fires are excluded from the aggregated value to measure only antropogenic emissions.  
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available for 188 countries over the years 1970-2013. The indicator is log-transformed due to posi-
tive skewness.  
 
Independent variables 
 
The first main independent variable of the study—the level of democracy—is a revised combined 
polity score taken from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2013).6 The index originally 
ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 stands for totalitarian regimes, while10 corresponds to the most 
democratic polities. I rescale the index to take only positive values for a more convenient interpre-
tation of the interaction term. In the new coding, counties having the scores between 1 and 5 are 
autocracies, states scoring between 5 and 16 are anocracies,7 and nations scoring between 17 and 21 
are democracies. The indicator is available from 1946 to 2012. 
 
The second main independent variable is control of corruption, taken from the World Bank Gov-
ernance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2014).8 The indicator measures perceptions of corruption in a 
country at a particular point of time, where higher values represent lower corruption. I transform 
the indicator to take only positive values by adding 2.5 to each value. This makes it easier to com-
pare the indicator with democracy scores in interaction. The indicator is available for the years 1996 
to 2012. 
 
Control variables 
 
Control variables include real GDP per capita in constant 2005 prices, taken from the Penn World 
Table (Heston et al. 2012), population size, taken from the Maddison-project (2013), population 
density (WB 2014), latitude to control for eventual effect of weather conditions (La Porta et al. 
1999), urbanization rate (WB 2014) and trade openness taken from Penn World Trade (Heston et 
al. 2012).  
 
                                                     
6
 The data are taken from Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al. 2014). 
7
 For the definition of anocracy, see (Marshall and Jaggers 2013). 
8
 The choice of data required certain compromises. The World Bank corruption indicator is correlated with GDP per capita at a higher 
extent than the corruption measure from ICRG (2014) (see Table 4 in Appendix A). However, the World Bank allows for larger cross-
country coverage (see Table 3 in Appendix A). Since in this study broader cross-country variation is more important than time coverage, 
to account for the maximum available variation in the sample, I use World Bank data.  
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Previous studies have shown that GDP per capita has an inverse U-shaped curved relationship with 
CO2 emissions (Grossman and Krueger 1994). However, the theory of Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC) assumes that the turn of the curve occurs, among other reasons, because countries 
start adopting and implementing environmental policies. Since the corruption indicator measures 
the capacity of the state to implement policies, I will use it as a means to model the curved pattern 
of the GDP-CO2 emissions relationship and additionally to compare explanatory powers of mod-
els, which include a corruption variable with the EKC model. Urbanization rate is expected to have 
a positive effect on CO2 emissions, due to concentration of cars and heating facilities in cities and 
towns. Trade in turn affects environmental behavior due to the pressure to uphold international 
environmental standards (Cole and Elliott 2003).  
 
Variables that are not normally distributed are log-transformed with the aim to improve the distri-
bution of residuals. These variables include GDP per capita, openness to trade, population size and 
population density. To minimize the number of missing values, I collected missing data on some of 
the independent variables.9 As a result, the models in this paper have higher cross-country coverage 
than did the previous studies using the same data. Table 3 in Appendix A presents summary statis-
tics for all variables, while Table 4 shows relevant correlations. 
 
Method 
 
In exploring the relationship between the slow-moving political variables and air pollution, we are 
more interested in long-run elasticity, or long-term total responses, rather than short-run elasticity, 
which measures immediate response of the dependent variable to the change. Following the advice 
by Stern (2010), who emphasizes the advantages of between estimator over other estimation tech-
niques in analyzing the long-run relationship between CO2 emissions and income, I also use the 
between-effects regression. In this study, I thus use time series data by calculating average values of 
the variables for each country over the time period available, but I focus on the difference between 
countries, which is a major source of the variation in the data.10 Between-effects regression there-
                                                     
9
 The data on latitude are collected from CIA (2013) for Central African Republic, Comoros, St. Vincent and Grenadines and Tuvalu. 
Latitude measure is divided by 90 to restrict the variance to 0-1 interval. Data on trade openness are taken from UNCTAD for Myanmar, 
North Korea and Tuvalu. Data on urban population for Tuvalu, population size for Comoros and population density for Taiwan are taken 
from CIA (2013) statistics. Missing values in GDP per capita for Myanmar, North Korea, Tuvalu, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Andorra and San 
Marino are filled with data from Gleditsch (2011).  
10
 As shown by rho-coefficient, which shows that 99,22% of the variance is due to differences across panels.  
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fore has an advantage over simple cross-country comparisons, since it adjusts the values for each 
country according to the historical data on the variables over the period available. It focuses on the 
long-run relationship between the variables by analyzing the data in view of cumulative historical 
changes that led to the current situation. The between-effects equation to be estimated is: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝛼+𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑖̅̅̅̅ + 𝜇𝑖   ,   (1) 
 
where  𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is a mean value of the natural logarithm of the dependent variable for the years availa-
ble for each country. 𝑋𝑗𝑖̅̅̅̅  is a vector of the mean values of independent variables for each country 
over the period available, while  𝜇𝑖  is a country-level error term. Mean values of the independent 
variables are taken over the same period of time for which the dependent variable is available. 
 
I estimate the equation five times, making changes in the composition of 𝑋𝑖 . The first two models 
test the effects of democracy and corruption control separately on the amount of carbon emissions, 
with controls. The third model is a simple additive relationship between democracy, corruption 
control and control variables, including a natural logarithm of GDP per capita: 
 
Xi = β1corri + β2demi + β3lnGDPi + βjZji   (2) 
 
where i denotes country, j is the number of control variables, corr is control of corruption measure, 
dem is democracy measure, lnGDP is a natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and Z is a vector of 
the rest of control variables. 
 
In the fourth model, I introduce the interaction term between corruption control and democracy 
(dem*corr): 
 
Xi = β1corri + β2demi + β3demi ∗ corri + β4lnGDPi + βjZji (3) 
 
In the fifth model, I include a squared term of GDP per capita instead of the interaction term to 
compare the explanatory powers of the interaction model and Environmental Kuznets Curve mod-
el between GDP per capita and emissions: 
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Xi = β1corri + β2demi + β3lnGDPi + β4lnGDPi
2 + βjZji   (4) 
 
The models have successfully passed standard regression diagnostics.  
 
Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results for equations 1-4. Model 1 shows the estimates of the relationship be-
tween democracy and CO2 emissions per capita, controlling for economic, demographic and geo-
graphical factors. The result is negative and significant, indicating that more democracy is associat-
ed with fewer emissions per capita. Model 2 estimates the independent effect of corruption control 
on the emissions level. The results are also negative and significant, implying that higher control of 
corruption is associated with lower levels of emissions. Model 3 shows the estimates of the rela-
tionship between democracy and CO2 emissions per capita while controlling for corruption. De-
mocracy becomes insignificant, while control of corruption retains a negative effect on emissions, 
implying that countries with lower corruption emit less. Model 5 shows that the effect of corrup-
tion persists even when squared GDP per capita is included to control for the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between GDP and emissions levels,11 while democracy remains insignificant. Model 4 
explicitly tests whether the effect of democracy on carbon emissions depends on corruption. While 
the interaction term is statistically significant, neither of its composite parts is. When disentangling 
the effects in interaction, however, it is more useful to look at margin plots than solely relying on 
the numbers.  
 
  
                                                     
11
 When corruption is excluded from the model, GDP per capita squared is significant and negative. Because GDP per capita is correlat-
ed with corruption measure, the fact that GDP squared is no longer significant after corruption is included indicates that the corruption 
measure to some extent captures the turn of the relationship curve between GDP per capita and carbon emissions.  
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TABLE 2, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION IN THEIR INTERDEPEND-
ENT EFFECT ON AIR POLLUTION  
 
  CO2 emissions per capita (log) 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 
      Democracy -0.021** 
 
-0.006 0.039 -0.008 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.025) (0.011) 
Control of Corruption 
 
-0.368*** -0.353*** -0.066 -0.316*** 
  
(0.065) (0.070) (0.160) (0.085) 
Democracy*Corruption 
   
-0.018** 
 
    
(0.008) 
 GDP/capita sq (log) 
    
-0.033 
     
(0.050) 
GDP/capita (log) 0.906*** 1.049*** 1.056*** 1.050*** 1.599* 
 
(0.134) (0.130) (0.132) (0.131) (0.903) 
Openness to trade (log) 0.487*** 0.447*** 0.439*** 0.420*** 0.416*** 
 
(0.100) (0.086) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) 
Urban Population, % 0.015** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Latitude 1.529*** 1.709*** 1.732*** 1.916*** 1.734*** 
 
(0.370) (0.314) (0.325) (0.322) (0.323) 
Population density (log) -0.048 -0.030 -0.028 -0.044 -0.025 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Population (log) 0.125*** 0.096** 0.096** 0.103** 0.092** 
 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 
Constant -10.984*** -11.261*** -11.260*** -11.782*** -13.375*** 
 
(0.987) (0.896) (0.902) (1.004) (3.879) 
      Observations 155 155 155 155 155 
R-squared
12
 0.875 0.889 0.890 0.892 0.890 
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 Before inclusion of GDP per capita, R-squared is .78. The small difference in the R-squared between the models shows that interaction 
terms between control of corruption and democracy do not contribute much to explaining the variation in the dependent variable. Howev-
er, examining interaction effects in detail through margins plots clarifies many of the nuances of the relationship between the level of 
democracy, control of corruption and air pollution.  
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Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are 
similar to standard errors, which means that the model is specified correctly (King and Roberts 
2015). Inclusion of regional dummies instead of latitude worsens the distribution of residuals; 
therefore, the model presented here includes latitude. Country dummies for island nations and oil 
producers turned out to be insignificant. The equations were additionally estimated using Freedom 
House/Polity IV score from Hadenius and Teorell (2005), dichotomous democracy measure from 
Cheibub et al. (2010) and ICRG indicator of corruption (ICRG 2014). The results remained robust. 
 
The interactive relationship between corruption and democracy in their effects on CO2 emissions is 
presented in Figure 4. The vertical axis on the left shows the magnitude of the marginal effect, 
while the vertical axis on the right is for the histogram and indicates the distribution of cases in the 
sample for the variable on the horizontal axis. Figure 4a shows that among countries with high and 
medium high control of corruption (scoring from 3 to 5 on a 0 to 5 scale), more democratic coun-
tries emit less. The histogram on the graph shows that this relationship holds for around 35% of 
the countries in the sample. Among countries that have low control of corruption (below 3 on a 0 
to 5 scale), there is no significant difference in the effect of democracy on air emissions. In other 
words, both democratic and non-democratic regimes seem to perform similarly if the corruption 
level is low.  
 
Figure 4b indicates that among countries scoring more than 8 on 1-21 scale, and therefore among 
both democratic and semi-democratic regimes,13 countries with higher corruption control produce 
less CO2 emissions per capita. The histogram overlaying the graph specifies that this is true for 
most cases in the sample. In countries that have a score below 7 on a 1-21 scale and are classified 
by Polity IV as autocracies, the effect of corruption control is insignificant. This means that there is 
no statistically significant difference in the emitting behavior between autocracies with high and low 
control of corruption.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13
 Also known as hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002), states under competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002), anocracies 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2013), or partly free countries (FreedomHouse 2013). 
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FIGURES 4, MARGINAL EFFECT PLOTS ILLUSTRATING CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY 
(A) AND CORRUPTION (B) ON CO2 EMISSIONS PER CAPITA 
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Figure 4 provides a clear illustration of the relationship between democracy and carbon emissions 
at different levels of corruption control, as well as between corruption control and carbon emis-
sions at different levels of democracy, and therefore makes it possible to detect and analyze pat-
terns described in hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. However, it is difficult to grasp the difference between 
cases located at different ends of the democracy and corruption control scales and therefore to 
analyze the pattern proposed in hypothesis 1.3. To do this, I construct a dichotomous measure of 
corruption control in which countries scoring above 3 on a 0-5 scale (or 0.5 on the original World 
Bank scale) are coded as 1 and countries with values below 2.5 (or 0 on the original World Bank 
scale) are coded as 0.14 
 
Figure 5 displays the marginal effect of corruption on CO2 emissions per capita conditional on 
democracy. The vertical axis is a linear prediction of the marginal effect. Rug plots at the bottom of 
the graph depict the distribution of cases by each group of control of corruption. The rug plot on 
top shows the distribution of cases in the group with low levels of corruption control, while the rug 
plot situated below depicts the distribution of cases in the high control of corruption group.  
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 The choice of boundaries between groups is guided by the results obtained from marginsplots depicted in Figure 4a. Countries in 
which the effect of democracy is significant and negative are coded into one group, while countries in which the effect of democracy 
tends to be positive (although insignificant) are coded into another group. Countries in between, which take values between 2.5 and 3, 
are omitted to increase the variation between the groups and obtain distinguishable results. As a result, the group with high control of 
corruption has 37 cases and the group with low control of corruption has 104 cases. Countries that take values between 2.5 and 3 and 
are omitted include Bahrain, Brazil, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Kiribati, Greece, Italy, Jordan, South Korea, Lesotho, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Oman, Namibia, Vanuatu, Poland, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Samoa.  
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FIGURE 5, CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF DICHOTOMIZED MEASURE OF CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION ON CO2  EMISSIONS PER CAPITA 
 
 
 
The pattern in the graph clearly resembles the relationship pictured in Figure 3. Since the depend-
ent variable is “flipped,” mirroring environmental degradation (higher is bad) rather than environ-
mental performance (higher is good) as in Figure 3, the pattern is reversed. The graph shows that 
being a corrupt country has a consistent positive effect on emissions, regardless of democracy level, 
as depicted by the solid line on Figure 5. In accordance with the patterns observed in the previous 
figures, however, the significant difference between corrupt and non-corrupt countries can only 
observed in countries scoring about 8 on the 1-21 scale, that is, democracies and anocracies. Being 
a non-corrupt country only results in lower emissions levels in democracies, while higher corrup-
tion control in authoritarian regimes does not seem to make any difference for the level of emis-
sions. 
 
Unlike the previous two figures, Figure 5 makes it possible to analyze the pattern suggested in Hy-
pothesis 1.3. Comparing the left quadrant on the dashed line to the right quadrant on the solid line, 
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we can observe that autocracies with high corruption control (left quadrant on the dashed line) do 
not perform significantly better than democracies with low control of corruption (right quadrant on 
the solid line). Although the line for non-corrupt countries (dashed) is situated somewhat lower, as 
predicted in Figure 3, the confidence intervals between non-democratic countries with high corrup-
tion control and democracies with low corruption control would overlap if they were overlaid.   
 
Discussion 
 
The results show that the effect of democracy on environmental quality is contingent on the levels 
of bureaucratic capacity. Although the initial models tested the independent effects of democracy 
and bureaucratic capacity on environmental quality and showed that control of corruption is a 
stronger predictor of air emissions than democracy, detailed analysis of the interaction between the 
two revealed a more pronounced relationship.  
 
The investigation showed that more democratic countries do tend to emit less, but only when bu-
reaucratic capacity is high—the finding that supports Hypothesis 1.1. Similarly, the results showed 
that higher bureaucratic capacity in democratic and semi-democratic regimes is associated with 
fewer carbon dioxide emissions per capita. For example, being democratic and non-corrupt Austria 
is more beneficial for reducing air emissions than being democratic and corrupt Slovakia. 
 
When bureaucratic capacity is low, however, democracy level does not seem to make a difference 
for the level of emissions. The results showed that low control of corruption seems to be associated 
with high carbon dioxide emissions across the whole democracy scale, which lends support to Hy-
pothesis 1.2. In practice, it means that it makes no difference to the level of carbon dioxide emis-
sions if a country is a democratic and corrupt Jamaica or an authoritarian and corrupt Azerbaijan.  
 
Contrary to expectations, the findings do not provide any support to Hypothesis 1.3. Authoritarian 
regimes with high bureaucratic capacity do not seem to perform significantly better than democra-
cies with low bureaucratic capacity. In practice it means that authoritarian Bhutan and Singapore, 
which have high levels of bureaucratic capacity, do not emit significantly less than democratic and 
corrupt India or Columbia. This finding speaks in favor of the democracy side of the story, imply-
ing that being a democracy is still important for reducing air emissions and that high bureaucratic 
capacity on its own is not a sufficient condition.  
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Implications for Environmental Kuznets Curve. It is acknowledged by the previous research that the U-
shaped relationship between GDP per capita and environmental quality is not a product of eco-
nomic forces, but is rather a proxy for other processes occurring in the society, such as technologi-
cal advancement and change to cleaner technology as well as improvements in environmental regu-
lations. Results from this study support the argument that the turn of the curve at higher levels of 
GDP per capita can be partly accounted for by the fact that rich countries tend to have lower levels 
of corruption and thus better capacity to implement existing environmental policies. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Previous empirical studies on political determinants of environmental quality have traditionally 
focused either on the role of democracy or the role of bureaucratic capacity in improving environ-
mental quality, rarely studying both factors together. This paper suggests that these two factors 
have to be considered in interaction, since they in large part shape the functioning of the input and 
output of the political system and therefore the delivery of public policy outcomes. While democra-
cy level determines the process by which the decisions are made in a country, bureaucratic capacity 
defines how these decisions are implemented and whether they are implemented at all. Focusing on 
only one side of the story limited the previous research, resulting in ambiguous theoretical claims 
and findings. This paper instead suggests a new way of analyzing the effect of democracy and bu-
reaucratic capacity on public policy outcomes and proposes looking at the patterns of interaction 
between them.  
 
This study compares polluting behavior of countries across the globe, investigating how democracy 
and bureaucratic capacity interact in their effect on carbon dioxide emissions. The evidence sup-
ports the theoretical expectations that the effect of democracy on the level of carbon dioxide emis-
sions depends on bureaucratic capacity. In accordance with most previous results, the findings of 
this paper show that more democratic countries tend to emit less. However, they contribute with 
one important specification: This is only true for those democracies in which bureaucratic quality is 
high. When bureaucratic capacity is low, democracy level does not seem to have any effect on CO2 
emissions. It does not matter to the levels of air pollution whether a country has free elections, 
freedom of the press and an engaged civil society if the administrative apparatus of the state does 
not function well and is drenched in corruption and clientelism. In such a case, democracies will 
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not do any better than authoritarian regimes, in which decision-making power is in the hands of a 
narrow elite.  
 
However, the results also show that bureaucratic capacity is not a universal cure. The assumption 
put forward by this study that authoritarian countries with high bureaucratic quality emit less than 
democratic countries with low bureaucratic capacity did not find any empirical support. Autocracies 
with high bureaucratic capacity do not seem to perform significantly better than democracies with 
low bureaucratic capacity. Taken together, these findings speak in favor of democracy, but only 
democracy that is free from corruption and has strong bureaucratic capacity. Neither democracy 
nor bureaucratic capacity alone seems to be sufficient conditions for reducing carbon emissions and 
fighting climate change.15  
 
The main contribution of the study is two-fold. Firstly, it connects two literatures on different po-
litical determinants of environmental quality and tests the interaction between the input and output 
sides of the political system on environmental outcomes. Secondly, it sheds light on the driving 
forces behind the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Future research can focus on exploring how the 
relationship between democracy and bureaucratic capacity plays out for environmental outcomes in 
specific countries, further test the proposed interactive relationship for other indicators of envi-
ronmental quality and, importantly, for different types of public goods. 
  
                                                     
15
 These results should be taken with caution, however, because they are based on between-estimation, which takes into account the 
countries’ accumulated polluting behavior. If some countries have only recently started to intensively implement environmental policies 
aimed at reducing pollution (e.g., China), the results of the paper might not have captured this yet due to the time lag with which data 
become broadly available. Investigation of such efforts and their effects requires in-depth case studies, which are beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
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Appendix A  
TABLE 3, SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES, COUNTRY MEANS  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CO2 per capita 186 0.3912131 1.756642 -3.783232 3.882139 
Democracy (rescaled) 166 12.07671 6.091159 1 21 
Corruption, WB (rescaled) 182 2.432111 0.98532 0.7752227 4.945254 
Corruption, ICRG 140 2.94041 1.12676 0.6364943 5.988506 
GDP per capita 181 8.384114 1.267137 5.978339 11.00602 
Openness to trade 181 4.115109 0.5911117 1.138329 5.486682 
Urban population 184 48.88113 22.94092 6.526023 100 
Population Density 184 3.898645 1.406525 0.2739286 8.465354 
Population size 184 8.557628 1.982887 2.266713 13.91044 
Latitude 177 0.2840239 0.1885861 0 0.7222222 
 
TABLE 4, CORRELATION BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 
Democr. Corr, WB Corr, ICRG 
GDP per 
capita (log) 
Openness to 
trade (log) 
Urban pop. Latitude 
Pop. Den-
sity (log) 
Pop. 
(log) 
Democracy 1 
        Corruption, WB 0.5862 1 
       Corruption, ICRG 0.5894 0.8976 1 
      GDP per capita (log) 0.4618 0.7556 0.6209 1 
     Openness to trade 
(log) -0.0441 0.1281 0.0368 0.2425 1 
    Urban population 0.2918 0.6195 0.496 0.8306 0.1777 1 
   Latitude 0.4475 0.5623 0.5208 0.5936 0.1048 0.5305 1 
  Population Density 
(log) 0.1733 0.1785 0.1216 0.1429 0.0593 0.076 0.1427 1 
 Population (log) 0.0302 -0.1187 -0.019 -0.1743 -0.5573 -0.1381 0.0528 0.2008 1 
 
